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THE ATTACK AT TARANTO
Tactical Success, Operational Failure
Lieutenant Colonel Angelo N. Caravaggio, Canadian Forces

T

he lack of a decisive British victory in the Mediterranean theater fundamentally affected British maritime strategy throughout the Second World War.
The Royal Italian Navy, or Regia Marina Italiana (RMI), exerted a disproportionate influence on British strategy and fleet disposition, because its existence could
not be ignored and British operations to eliminate it failed. On 11 November
1940, Admiral Andrew Cunningham, the British commander of naval forces in
the Mediterranean, had the opportunity to eliminate the entire complement of
battleships from the Italian order of battle, at Taranto. However, questionable decisions in the planning process, combined with Cunningham’s decision to launch
a considerably reduced strike force, succeeded in only temporarily reducing the
Italian battle fleet from six to two battleships. More importantly, the British failed
to capitalize on the operational-level opportunities resulting from the success of
their attack. Britain held the initiative, but the window of opportunity to decisively shape the conditions in the Mediterranean theatre after Taranto was finite,
1
and it closed with the arrival of the German Fliegercorps X in January 1941.
The widely accepted assessment of the outcome of
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to deliver a decisive blow at Taranto obliged the British to tie up in the Mediterranean naval forces that otherwise could have been deployed to the Atlantic, Indian, or Pacific theaters. The lack of British strategic and operational focus at
this critical juncture of the war squandered vital resources and resulted in
3
missed opportunities. Consequently, the Italians were allowed to recover from
what was seemingly a decisive British victory and, in the following three years,
force Britain to commit, and subsequently lose, a sizable portion of its surface
fleet to contain the Italian “fleet in being.” By measuring success gained against
operational objectives assigned, this article will argue that the British attack at
Taranto was a tactical success but one that did not significantly alter the strategic
balance in the Mediterranean, because the British failed to capitalize on the operational opportunities resulting from their attack.
STRATEGIC OVERVIEW: BRITAIN
Since the eighteenth century it had been British policy to maintain at least a
one-power standard of naval strength (that is, determination to exceed the
forces of any other single power) in the Mediterranean. With the opening of the
Suez Canal, the Mediterranean became the main artery of imperial sea lines of
communication, raising significantly the importance of this region.4 In the
interwar period, British naval planners were faced with the question not merely
of what sort of fleet they needed but also of how to balance commitments and
resources in an era of considerable political and technological uncertainty. The
decision was made to base much of the British fleet in the Mediterranean, a strategically sound position from which to move either to home waters against the
5
Germans or to the Far East against the Japanese.
The key to the Mediterranean theater was the island fortress of Malta, some
sixty miles south of Sicily. The former had been under the British flag since 1800.
It supplied a refuge and refueling point for warships and merchant ships midway
between Gibraltar and Alexandria, and it served as a forward base for submarine
and light surface forces. Initially, Malta was considered indefensible in a Mediterranean war, but this belief changed quickly once hostilities began and Italy failed
6
to invade it. Malta became the focus of British strategy in the Mediterranean.
From the fall of France to May 1943, the Mediterranean was the main theater
for Britain and Italy. Prime Minister Winston Churchill believed that the British
position in the Mediterranean and the Middle East had to be maintained and
strengthened, with seapower as the decisive factor. The operational objectives
provided to Cunningham as Commander in Chief, Mediterranean, could be
summarized as follows:
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• Destruction of the Italian fleet and merchant vessels, and German ships if
they appeared

• Support for the army in North Africa or for any expedition it might
undertake

• Safe conduct of British and Allied merchant ships through the Mediterranean and Red Sea

• Prevention of enemy attack by sea on Gibraltar, Malta, Cyprus, Egypt, or
the Levant coast.

7

To accomplish these objectives, the British decided to split the theater and establish two fleets. The first, under Cunningham and stationed in Alexandria,
was responsible for the eastern Mediterranean as far as the Sicilian narrows, a
zone that included Malta. The second, a new fleet called Force H, was established at
Gibraltar on 28 June 1940 under Vice Admiral Sir James Somerville. Force H was
to operate in the western basin of the Mediterranean and be available for opera8
tions in the Atlantic as required. Both fleets reported to the Admiralty in London.
Even with the declaration of war by Italy on 11 June 1940 and the collapse of
France on 22 June, the fleet balance in the Mediterranean favored the British. At
that time, the British had available in the Mediterranean seven battleships, two
carriers, six cruisers, one antiaircraft cruiser, twenty-nine destroyers, and ten
submarines. Against this force, the RMI could array two battleships, nineteen
9
cruisers, fifty destroyers, and 115 submarines. Even though three of their battleships were “unmodernized,” the British held a significant operational advantage,
since the Royal Navy could reinforce the Mediterranean as required from other
10
fleets outside the theater.
STRATEGIC OVERVIEW: ITALY
Italian strategic planning in the interwar period had precluded war with England.
It was assumed that Italy would have to face only France, which at most could
count on the support of Greece and Yugoslavia. Even after 1936, there was no
reason to believe that war with Britain was imminent.11 However, as Italian lines
of communication with their African colonies intersected the important British
routes from Gibraltar to the Suez Canal, any conflict in the Mediterranean
would draw in the British, to ensure the safety of their strategic lines of commu12
nication. The British viewed Italy’s interior position as an advantage; the Italians, however, viewed their geographic position as a disadvantage, seeing
themselves essentially locked in the Mediterranean with the British controlling
13
the exits.
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After learning of Benito Mussolini’s plans for war, Admiral Domenico
Cavagnari, the Italian chief of naval staff, sent Mussolini a lengthy memorandum arguing that Italy was not yet prepared for war. Cavagnari made it clear that
the Italian navy could not sustain a prolonged war and that Italy did not have the
industrial base to replace ship losses in such a war. Italian naval operations had
to be planned and conducted with the knowledge that losses could not be made
14
good. Perhaps most critical of all, a concern that would play a major role in the
coming campaign, was the fact that the Italians were almost completely dependent for fuel on German stocks. The RMI would begin with oil reserves sufficient to support only nine months of operations.15
The Italian military lacked well-defined strategic objectives beyond Mussolini’s
16
desire for offensive action “at all points in the Mediterranean and outside.” Operational directives issued by the Naval High Command (Supermarina) on 29 May
1940 established a defensive posture in both the eastern and western basins,
leaving the Sicilian Channel as the principal theater for offensive fleet operations. Operational-level tasks assigned to the RMI included protecting the Italian coastline and the sea lines of communication with North Africa, Albania,
and the Aegean. Fleet engagements were to take place only on terms favorable to
17
the Italians.
Italian naval doctrine was based on the assumption that convoys and convoy
protection would not be required; protecting merchant shipping would not be a
primary task except on specific and infrequent occasions. However, by the middle of July 1940 the requirement for a permanent convoy organization was clear;
the RMI had to adopt convoy escort tactics, both air and sea, which had not been
18
originally contemplated. A major problem, however, was that the RMI did not
have aircraft carriers or its own naval air arm. It had to rely on the air force (the
Regia Aeronautica Italiana, or RAI) for air support.
Fault for the lack of aircraft carriers in the RMI has been assigned to both
19
Mussolini and his admirals. Regardless, all Italian military aircraft were placed
under the control of the RAI, and all aircraft development as well. The RMI assumed that the air force would take part in maritime operations, but there was
no attempt on the part of senior officers or their staffs in either service to discuss
how operations would be coordinated. As it was, any air-related mission in support of the fleet and fleet operations had to compete for resources with other operational tasks. The lack of operational-level cooperative arrangements between
the RMI and RAI and the complete absence of any clear doctrine for air support
of maritime operations significantly hindered the overall effectiveness of these
20
two services.
The lack of a naval air arm also had an impact on harbor defense, in particular anti-torpedo netting. Since the RAI had no dedicated torpedo bombers or
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol59/iss3/8
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doctrine for their
employment, it did
not understand the
requirements for defense against such
an attack. The navy
felt relatively safe
having its ships in
the forty-foot-deep
waters of Taranto
Harbor, believing
that air-dropped torpedoes could not be
effectively launched
in waters so shallow.
The Italians did not
know that the British had overcome the problem of the initial sudden diving of a torpedo released
from an airplane. In addition, the RMI grossly overestimated the minimum
launch distance from the target required for the arming of a torpedo. Also unknown to the Italians was the fact that a torpedo could now be triggered in two
ways: by contact, or by proximity to the magnetic field of a ship’s hull, using a de21
vice called a duplex pistol. These factors all influenced Italian defensive planning and created opportunities for exploitation by an enemy.
Anti-torpedo netting was considered the main defense for a ship in harbor
against an air-launched torpedo. Italian anti-torpedo netting of 1940 suffered
from two problems: the Italians did not have enough of it, and what they had
was of an inadequate design. Taranto, for example, required 12,800 meters of
anti-torpedo netting, but only 4,200 meters were in the water at the time of the
22
attack. The deployed netting was designed to protect against torpedoes armed
with contact pistols; it protected only the sides of a battleship, and only to the
depth of its maximum draft. Because it did not prevent the passage of a weapon
beneath the ship, this netting provided practically no defense against the duplex
pistol–armed torpedoes in use by the Swordfish aircraft of the British Fleet Air
Arm (FAA). The main component of Italian harbor defense, therefore, was
based on flawed assessments derived from incomplete knowledge of torpedo
warfare. The conditions at Taranto Harbor on 11 November 1940, then, were
ripe for a decisive British victory.
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THE PLAN
The naval war in the Mediterranean up to November 1940 involved many of the
functional roles of seapower. The first instances of power projection by naval
aircraft, which occurred here, presaged the center stage this capability would
take in the Pacific, while the attacks on trade and defense of shipping in the Mediterranean exhibited the characteristics of the convoy war in the Atlantic. Aircraft, submarines, and escorts played major roles in the interdiction of seaborne
23
communications. The heavy losses by the opposing navies made it apparent
that neither side had a definitive superiority over the other. Everything depended on which side could more successfully exploit the other’s weaknesses in
order to achieve naval supremacy.24
Cunningham saw his principal tasks as the disruption of Axis convoys to Af25
rica and the protection of British convoys to Malta. He felt that in order to accomplish these tasks he had to neutralize or destroy the Italian fleet at its main
operating base at Taranto. The only viable option available to him was an attack
by carrier-based planes of the Fleet Air Arm. The FAA possessed adequate numbers of only one type of attack aircraft, the Fairey Swordfish, which could carry
26
either bombs or torpedoes. Despite its age and slow speed the Swordfish could
operate at night, a unique attribute for its time and one that provided the British
with the vital capability necessary to launch an operation against Taranto.
Taranto Harbor lay in the Gulf of Taranto some 320 miles from Malta. The inner harbor (Mar Piccolo) was completely landlocked except for a narrow channel, which would admit ships only of cruiser size or smaller. It contained
extensive dock facilities, and its small size made surface ships within it virtually
safe from attack with torpedoes. The larger outer harbor (Mar Grande), which
opened to the west and where capital ships were obliged to moor, was protected
27
from surface attack by long breakwaters. Taranto’s location was a key element
of its value to the Italian navy—it was conveniently close to the British
Malta-to-Suez run yet sequestered enough to be easily guarded by land-based
planes.
The idea of an airborne torpedo attack at Taranto had its genesis in 1935 after
Italy invaded Abyssinia. Admiral Dudley Pound, then commander of the British
Mediterranean Fleet, ordered the preparation of a plan for such an attack. The
resulting plan sat in a navy safe until 1938, when Captain Arthur L. St. George
Lyster arrived to take command of Glorious, then the only British carrier in the
Mediterranean. Lyster reviewed the plan, updated it, and tested its precepts. After extensive testing and training, Lyster and his senior officers decided that the
scheme was plausible, given surprise and luck. In September 1940, Lyster pre28
sented the updated plan to Cunningham at a meeting in Alexandria.
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In general, Lyster’s plan envisioned a moonlit attack against the harbor, with
torpedo-equipped planes striking the battleships moored in the outer harbor
while bombers would aim for ships and installations in the inner basin. It envisioned a force of thirty Swordfish in two waves of fifteen aircraft. Each wave
would have nine aircraft armed with torpedoes to attack the battleships, five
with bombs to dive-bomb the cruisers and the destroyers, and one armed with a
combination of bombs and magnesium parachute flares. The plan called for a
repeat of the operation the following night with a single strike force of fifteen
aircraft comprising six torpedo aircraft, seven dive-bombers, and two flare
29
droppers.
The torpedo attack was to be made from the west and toward the rising
moon. The date for the attack would, therefore, be dependent on the phase of the
moon and time of moonrise. Based on the time and distance factors required to
achieve surprise—getting the carriers to the launch point under the cover of
darkness, launching and recovering aircraft in darkness, and then exiting the
area—the planners determined that the carrier force could not be north of a line
from Malta to Kithera before dark. The run north had to be made before
moonrise and the aircraft launched by 9 PM. A further restriction involved the
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speed and endurance restrictions of the aircraft; their return trip could be no
greater than four hundred miles. The launch point for the attack was established
as forty miles from Kabbo Point, just west of the Greek island of Cephalonia,
about 170 miles southeast of Taranto.
Originally, two carriers, Illustrious and Eagle, were to take part in the attack,
and by mid-October both had completed a series of rigorous exercises, including
night flying, and were considered ready for the operation. The attack was planned
for the night of 21 October but had to be deferred because of a fire in Illustrious’s
hangar that destroyed or damaged a number of aircraft. The attack was rescheduled for 30 October, but again it had to be delayed, since on that night the moon
would not provide the required illumination.30 Any night from 11 to 19 November
would offer suitable moonlit conditions; the date was fixed for the 11th, to take
advantage of the confusion among the Italians that could be expected from the
larger undertaking, known as Operation MB8, of which the Taranto attack, Opera31
tion JUDGEMENT, was to be a part.
MB8 involved a series of ten operations to be executed between 4 and 14 November, including:
1. Convoy AN6: from Egypt to the Aegean

2. Convoy MW3: from Egypt to Malta and Souda Bay
3. Operation COAT: passage from Gibraltar to Alexandria of Force F, comprising the battleship Barham, the cruisers Berwick and Glasgow, and
three destroyers carrying troops and stores that were to be landed at
Malta en route
4. Operations COAT and CRACK: passage of Force H from Gibraltar to the
Sicilian Narrows followed by an air attack on Elmas airfield at Cagliari
5. Convoy ME3: four empty merchant ships steaming from Malta to Egypt,
in conjunction with the passage of destroyers Terror and Vendetta from
Malta to Souda Bay
6. Convoy AS5: from the Aegean to Egypt
7. Passage of the cruisers Ajax and Sydney from Port Said to Souda Bay
with troops and equipment
8. Transit of the cruiser Orion from Port Said to Piraeus and Souda Bay
with Royal Air Force stores and personnel
9. JUDGEMENT: passage of the Mediterranean Fleet, Force A, from Alexandria to meet Force F off Gozo, then to carry out a Fleet Air Arm attack
on Taranto
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10. A raid on the Strait of Otranto by the cruisers Orion, Ajax, and Sydney
32
and two destroyers.
Altogether, British forces at sea for this operation amounted to five battleships,
two aircraft carriers, ten cruisers, thirty destroyers, and a few auxiliaries.
Unfortunately for the British, Eagle had to be withdrawn because of serious
defects in its fuel system caused by near misses in an air attack on 11 July. Five of
its aircraft were flown off to Illustrious; this set the strength of the striking force
at twenty-four planes. Further mishaps involving contaminated fuel and other
33
technical difficulties reduced the actual number to twenty-one.
Using reconnaissance aircraft from Malta, the RAF kept Taranto under nearly
continuous observation until 11:30 PM on 11 November. Photographs taken
that day revealed that six Italian battleships and three cruisers, together with
some destroyers, were moored on the shoreward side of Taranto’s outer harbor,
with two more cruisers, twenty-one destroyers, sixteen submarines, nine tank34
ers, and many more smaller craft in the inner harbor. These photos also revealed that the torpedo planes would have to fly through a barrier of balloons to
reach their dropping positions. By the time the first flight left Illustrious, all of
the observers on board the Swordfish knew the exact positions of the six battleships in the outer harbor and the latest arrangements of the balloon barrage and
35
net defenses. Originally, ninety balloons, tethered by steel cables, had been deployed across the harbor in three rows, but luckily for the British a lack of hydrogen had reduced the number to twenty-seven on the night of the attack: sixteen
moored west and north of the ships on the Tarantola Jetty and eleven along the
eastern part of the same jetty.
British planners were concerned that searchlights aimed at low angles might
dazzle the pilots of the torpedo-armed aircraft. It was decided that a distraction
was needed to keep the searchlights directed upward. Originally, this distraction
was to have been provided by Wellington bombers from Malta that were to attack the dockyard and ships in Mar Piccolo between 8:30 and 9:15. Inexplicably,
36
this proposal was not adopted. Instead the British decided to use some of the
attacking Swordfish as dive-bombers to provide the desired distraction. Their
confidence in so reducing the strike force to only two-thirds of its original
strength may have been based, in part, on experience gained in earlier operations against similar targets.
British experience, technology, and doctrine in attacking ships in harbor had
in fact progressed steadily since the outbreak of the war. The event having key influence on the Taranto attack occurred at Dakar on 8 July 1940—a torpedo attack of six Swordfish aircraft from 814 Squadron of the carrier Hermes upon the
37
French battleship Richelieu in the harbor. Three torpedoes were armed with
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duplex pistols and three with contact pistols. The duplex torpedoes were set to run
at thirty-eight feet, under the ship, and those carrying the contact pistols at
38
twenty-four feet. All six were set to run at forty knots. French sources later revealed
that Richelieu was hit by one torpedo that blew a twenty-five-by-twenty-foot
hole in the ship. The explosion fractured the sternpost, distorted the starboard
inboard propeller shaft, and flooded three compartments. Repairs to the
39
Richelieu would take more than a year to complete.
The extent of the damage caused by one torpedo at Dakar was not lost on the
British, whose analysis of this attack was critical to the success of the Taranto operation. Taking into consideration the shallowness of the water (forty-two feet)
at Dakar and the fact that the target had been at anchor, it was determined that
the torpedo high-speed setting of forty knots should not have been used. It was
known that at forty knots the Mark XII torpedoes were prone to an excessive
dive upon striking the water, significantly less so at the twenty-nine-knot setting. In addition, the running depth of the duplex-pistol torpedoes at Dakar was
assessed as having been too deep, and thirty-two feet was recommended for future operations. Since the conditions at Taranto Harbor would be similar—
ships at anchor in forty feet of water—these findings were the basis for new settings established for Taranto. All torpedoes were to run at twenty-seven knots
and at a depth of thirty-three feet, and all were armed with duplex pistols.40 British experience and planning had correctly assessed the tactics necessary to
achieve the desired effect.
THE ATTACK
The twenty-one Swordfish were launched in two waves: the first, of twelve aircraft, was airborne by 8:40 PM, and the second, with nine aircraft, was away by
41
9:34. Six of the first wave and four of the second wave carried bombs. Each
bomb-armed Swordfish carried six 250-pound bombs, and the flare aircraft
42
each carried four bombs and sixteen flares. It was the first duty of the latter to
lay the flares in a line so as to show up in silhouette the Italian battleships in the
43
outer harbor.
When the last Swordfish attack was complete, Italy’s serviceable battleships
had been reduced from six to two—only Vittorio Veneto and Giulio Cesare had
escaped damage—and all of this had been accomplished at the cost of only two
44
Swordfish shot down. In all, the British launched eleven torpedoes. Littorio suffered three torpedo hits, Duilio and Cavour one each. Several torpedoes became
stuck in the muddy bottom of the harbor. Of the sixty bombs dropped, a quarter
failed to explode, including the bombs that hit the cruiser Trento, the destroyer
Libeccio, and two fleet auxiliaries. Other bombs caused fires in the dockyard and
at the seaplane base, where two aircraft were destroyed. A number of bombs fell
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol59/iss3/8
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near the Chiappare oil depot; many fell in the dockyard, but only four of these
45
exploded.
The strike aircraft were successfully recovered aboard Illustrious. British aircrews were anxious to repeat the operation the next night in accordance with
the original plan. However, on the strength of a forecast of bad weather,
Cunningham decided against the idea. Illustrious and its escorts withdrew unde46
tected and rejoined the fleet.
On 12 November the battleships that could steam—Giulio Cesare, Vittorio
Veneto, and Andrea Doria—were transferred to Naples. Meanwhile, salvage operations began on the damaged ones. Littorio and Duilio could be moved within
a few days to shipyards for repairs. Littorio was ready for sea by the end of March
1941, and Duilio was ready by the middle of May. Cavour had to be beached after
the torpedo attack. It was refloated in July 1941 and towed to Trieste to be repaired, but the work was not complete by the time of the armistice.47
THE CONSENSUS REVISITED
The general consensus of the historical analysis from immediately after the
event until now is that the attack was a decisive blow that altered the balance of
naval power in the Mediterranean. “In a total flying time of about six hours,”
wrote Cunningham, “twenty aircraft had inflicted more damage on the Italian
Fleet than was inflicted on the German High Seas Fleet in the daylight action at
the battle of Jutland.”48 Churchill declared enthusiastically to the British House
of Commons, “The result affects decisively the balance of naval power in the
Mediterranean and also carries with it reactions upon the naval situation in ev49
ery quarter of the globe.” The German naval command mirrored Churchill’s
assessment, suggesting that the British would now have complete freedom to reinforce their positions in the Mediterranean and Middle East, transfer ships to
the Atlantic, and mount offensive operations that would place the Italian land
50
operations in Egypt in jeopardy.
Cunningham was convinced that the attack greatly increased British freedom
of movement in the Mediterranean and strengthened British control over its
51
central area. Operationally, Cunningham felt, the Taranto raid reduced if not
altogether eliminated the threat of the Italian fleet’s interfering with British
convoys to Greece and Crete. Cunningham also claimed that the success of the
raid allowed British battleship strength in the eastern Mediterranean to be reduced. The immediate tactical impact, however, was relief for the British destroyer flotillas, as fewer of them were now required to screen for the smaller
battle fleet.52
The current literature generally supports these deductions. The most commonly repeated statement about the effect of the raid at Taranto is that the
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53

attack established British “moral ascendancy” over the RMI. James
Sadkovich, a historian of the Italian navy, views these assessments as part of an
Anglo-American consensus that has determined that the RMI “lacked will54
power,” avoided the British fleet, and was generally “inept.” Sadkovich disagrees with this standard view, pointing out that despite the loss of four
battleships, by 28 November the battleships Vittorio Veneto and Giulio Cesare
and their escorts were again at sea attempting to intercept Force H and the
55
Malta-bound convoy it was covering.
While the Italian battle fleet may have remained elusive, the Italian escort
forces got on with their primary task of supplying Italian armies in Albania and
Libya across the breadth of the Mediterranean, with near-daily sailings of convoys and single ships. In this task they were highly effective. The reality of the operational situation was that the continued existence of Italian battleships, even if
they never put to sea, necessitated the retention of British capital ships in a state
56
of readiness at both ends of the Mediterranean. The attack at Taranto provided
the British with a temporary superiority in capital ships but was far from the significant victory proclaimed. Had other options been chosen, however, the outcome could have been decisive.
Options Available to Cunningham
The decisions made in preparing the attack plan at Taranto have not received the
critical scrutiny that they deserve. Wayne Hughes, a longtime scholar of fleet tactics, has stated as the great naval maxim, “Attack effectively first.” This motto is
57
the very essence of tactical action for success in naval combat. The Taranto attack, while generally successful, could have been far more effective. The plan suffered from a number of significant weaknesses, including the lack of a clear
intent, questionable targeting and apportionment decisions, and lack of provision for exploiting success. Assessment of the success of the attack hinges on the
answer to one key question—why was the attack launched? The answer is not as
clear as might be expected.
The information available today offers conflicting evidence as to the true intent of the attackers.58 Was the attack envisioned as a hit-and-run-type raid to
inflict damage on the Italian fleet, for a temporary tactical advantage, or was it a
coordinated effort to eliminate the Italian battleships, for long-term gain? The
plan contained components of both types of naval actions. For example, a raid
would not normally have included provisions for a follow-up strike the next evening, whereas a plan designed as a sustained effort would have done so. If sustained effort was indeed the intent, then the operation should have been delayed
until more forces were available. Those allocated were woefully inadequate, due
to the dispersion necessary to achieve simultaneously all the objectives of
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Operation MB8. The Taranto operation was too important to conduct as a sideshow of an already complicated plan. A deliberate operation against Taranto
with all available resources, Royal Navy and Royal Air Force, would have produced, we must presume, the truly devastating results envisioned.
If the intent was to execute a hit-and-run attack, other options available to the
British would have increased its effectiveness. The actual target-selection and
arming decisions made for the attack reflect a fundamental lack of understand59
ing of targeting. Arming six of the planes with bombs for use against cruisers
and destroyers in the inner harbor at the expense of six more torpedoes for attacks against the battleships diluted striking power. The decision in the planning
stages of the attack to limit the number of torpedo planes to six per wave was
based on an erroneous assessment that balloons and net obstructions would restrict suitable dropping places in the harbor.60 Even though intelligence photos
had revealed that the Italian balloon defense was considerably weaker than expected, the arming decisions were not changed. These decisions are indicative of
the relative infancy of British strike warfare at the time.
Other decisions in force apportionment highlight the weakness in British planning in other ways. Four battleships (Cavour, Littorio, Duilio, and Vittorio Veneto)
and the Gorizia, a heavy cruiser (that is, with a main battery of eight-inch guns),
were designated for torpedo attacks. Cavour was targeted by three planes, Littorio
61
by five planes, Duilio by one, Vittorio Veneto by two, and Gorizia by one. Giulio
62
Cesare and Andrea Doria were not targeted either by bombs or torpedoes. Vittorio
Veneto, as one of the two most powerful battleships in the Italian navy, should have
received a greater relative weight of effort. Damage to both Vittorio Veneto and
Littorio would have created severe problems for the Italians, since there was only a
single dry dock in the entire country (in Genoa) capable of taking those new ships,
63
and then only one at a time. Arming six more planes with torpedoes would have
allowed all the battleships to be targeted with multiple attacks; even this small adjustment in the plan would very likely have proven devastating.
Further, the weight of the attack could have been significantly increased by a
second carrier. Admiral Lyster deeply regretted the unavoidable absence of Eagle.
“Her fine squadrons,” he wrote in a private letter, “would have increased the
64
weight of the attack considerably, and I believe would have made it devastating.”
In fact, however, Cunningham could have replaced Eagle with Ark Royal.
Ark Royal had been undergoing a refit for most of the month of October 1940
65
and had returned to Force H on 6 November. The ship and its squadrons had
gained considerable combat experience. They had participated in the Norwegian
campaign and had taken part in the attack on the French navy at Mers-el-Kebir,
Algeria, in July and again at Dakar in September. Ark Royal could accommodate between sixty and seventy-two aircraft. While some of its experienced
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aircrew had been siphoned away during its refit, two of its squadrons, one of Skuas
(810 Squadron) and one of Swordfish (818 Squadron), retained their experienced
66
leadership. The input of these veterans during the planning might have produced critical improvements in such areas as targeting and allocation that would
have increased the decisiveness of the attack.
Ark Royal could have been used in two ways. First, its Swordfish squadrons
could have replaced those of Eagle. This would have required a slight delay while
the aircrews were briefed and the ships repositioned. In this case, it would have
been necessary to weigh the addition of twenty-six Swordfish against the relative
inexperience of the Ark Royal squadrons in night flying. The latter risk, however,
could have been mitigated by having Illustrious aircraft lead the attack waves to
the target. Alternatively, all of the Eagle’s attack aircraft could have been transferred to Ark Royal and flown from that ship, either alone or with augmentation
from Ark Royal’s air group. In addition, Ark Royal’s radar combined with its
larger complement of fighters would have provided the task group with the ability to loiter in the central Mediterranean and effectively protect itself while wait67
ing for a decision to reattack.
Another option available to Cunningham was to insist on a supporting attack
68
by RAF Wellington bombers from Malta. The target would have been Taranto’s
port facilities, in particular the oil storage tanks; the aim would have been to deny
Taranto to the RMI as an operating base. An attack on the harbor facilities by
Wellingtons, with their heavy bomb loads, would have allowed the FAA, with its
torpedo-armed Swordfish, to concentrate a maximum effort against the battleships.
Moreover, the confusion resulting from a coordinated attack could have facilitated
the attack by the torpedo planes. That the RAF was capable of conducting this operation was made evident two days later, on 13 November, when ten Wellington
69
bombers from Malta did indeed attack the port facilities at Taranto.
Regardless of the type of attack envisioned, the plan should have dealt with
surviving Italian ships, battleships in particular, that attempted to escape to safer
harbors after the initial attack. There is no indication that the British ever considered this contingency. The British knew that there were six battleships in
Taranto, but the best they could hope to accomplish, as the attack was laid out,
was damage to four of them. Thereafter the two undamaged battleships and any
other major combatants that could do so would undoubtedly get out of Taranto
as quickly as possible. That there were no provisions for this response must be
viewed as a critical flaw in the plan. Stationing reconnaissance aircraft and submarines to watch the Straits of Messina and the likely escape routes, with Force
H and Ark Royal’s strike aircraft ready to respond to sightings, would have afforded the British the opportunity of damaging or even eliminating permanently ships not damaged in the attack itself.
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Aside from that, the effort against the remaining Italian capital ships could
have been sustained in two other ways: targeting the ships themselves or denying
them infrastructure and resources they required. As for the first, the remaining
battleships could, for example, have been targeted by Operations MC2 and MC3,
which were carried out between 16 and 22 December 1940. These operations
had the following elements:

• Attacks on Italian bases in the Dodecanese by aircraft from Illustrious
• Bombardment of the port and military objectives at Port Skala, Valona
• Attacks on Italian forces and shipping in the Adriatic
• Attacks with torpedo aircraft on shipping in Port Skala
• Cover for several convoys: MW5A and B (fast and slow convoys from
Alexandria to Malta), the Ulster Prince (with personnel from Port Said to
Crete and Greece), ME5A (from Malta to Alexandria and Port Said), and
70
AS 9 and AN 10 (Aegean convoys).
Here, as at Taranto, British intelligence sources provided the information
needed for another attack against the remaining Italian battleships. Reconnaissance pinpointed the disposition of the three Italian battleships—Giulio Cesare,
Vittorio Veneto, and Andrea Doria—on 15 December, confirming one back at
71
Taranto and the other two at Naples. British forces were conducting operations
in and near these ports, and both RAF bombers from Malta and FAA aircraft
from Ark Royal and Illustrious were available for a strike. However, there is no evidence to indicate that another attack by FAA aircraft was contemplated.
Another possibility would have been to use the growing Royal Air Force resources available at Malta. A comprehensive RAF air campaign against support
infrastructure, especially the dry dock in Genoa and oil storage facilities, would
have hampered the Italians’ ability to repair damaged ships and crippled any remaining operational capability. A comprehensive air campaign against Italian
harbors was eventually initiated, in mid-December, but by that time the opportunities offered by the success at Taranto were vanishing.
One of the most important operational advantages that could have been
gained from a more aggressive posture after Taranto would have been in operational logistics. Up until this point in the war, the British had been unable to use
direct sea routes through the Mediterranean except for the occasional heavily
defended convoy. The British success at Taranto did not change this policy. For
example, of the twenty-one British supply ships destined for the Middle East
that left Britain on 18 December 1940, sixteen sailed round the Cape and only
five risked the Mediterranean. The majority of British supply ships destined for
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the Middle East continued to be routed around the Cape of Good Hope even
though this route involved as much as a four-month round trip for the ships
72
involved. Routing convoys through Cape Town and Durban increased cycle
times and was to blame, in part, for a shortage of mercantile tonnage at this
73
stage of the war. The proven scarcity and ineffectiveness of Italian air reconnaissance combined with a reduced surface threat should have enticed the
British to send more convoys through the Mediterranean, thereby providing
74
greater flexibility in managing their theater logistics. The threat from the surviving Italian battleships and an exaggerated fear of Italian airpower continued
to influence British naval operational planning inexplicably in the months fol75
lowing Taranto.
Further, there is clear evidence that British fleet resources committed to the
Mediterranean after Taranto were desperately needed elsewhere. An Admiralty
message to Cunningham on 22 November 1940 stated urgent considerations
that demanded redistribution of the fleet. These factors included:

• The appearance of the pocket battleship Admiral Scheer in the North
Atlantic

• Uncertainty as to whether the Admiral Scheer had proceeded south76
• The existence of, probably, five disguised enemy surface raiders in the
South Atlantic, Indian, and Pacific Oceans, where they were taking a heavy
toll of shipping

• The need for escorts for troop convoys carrying reinforcements to the
Middle East.

77

“Under these circumstances,” said the First Sea Lord, “it is considered imper78
ative that raider hunting groups shall be formed without delay.” For these
hunting groups the Admiralty wanted the battleships Renown from Force H and
Ramillies, either Ark Royal or Formidable, and two cruisers, Manchester and
Southampton. As a contingency, the battleship Valiant was to be transferred
from the eastern to the western basin. Cunningham responded that he would
find it difficult to part with Valiant, because of its powerful antiaircraft armament; none of the remaining battleships were similarly armed or had radar. If
Valiant were to be withdrawn, he would be left with only one battleship,
Warspite, that could engage the Italians at long range. He offered to surrender instead the eight-inch cruiser Berwick. In the end, only the Ramillies and Berwick
were made available for reassignment.
By December the Italians had recovered from the psychological impact of the
79
Taranto attack and had greatly increased their harbor defenses. Littorio and
Duilio were under repair, and German air units of Fliegerkorps X, specializing in
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antiship attacks, were being transferred to the Mediterranean. The balance of
power, especially in the air, was rapidly changing back in the Axis’s favor.
Measures of Success
In terms of the objectives of holding Malta as an advanced base of operations
and keeping the Mediterranean open to maritime traffic, the raid on Taranto
had little effect. In a letter to Admiral Pound on 22 September 1940,
Cunningham expressed his desire to make Malta a fully operational “strike base”
by 1 April 1941, capable of supporting sustained operations by all three services.
In particular, Cunningham expected that Malta would have a force of cruisers
and destroyers permanently based on the island; safe docking, refit, and repair
facilities for warships; a submarine flotilla; airfields from which to operate
bomber, reconnaissance, and four fighter squadrons; and raiding forces of troops
80
that could operate from Malta. According to Cunningham’s estimate Malta
81
would need for these approximately four hundred thousand tons of supplies.
The aftermath of the Taranto strike presented an excellent opportunity to exploit a weakened Italian position and to bolster the British position in Malta, but
the response was anemic. From the attack until the end of December 1940 the
British sailed only three convoys totaling fourteen ships to Malta, approximately
82
sixty thousand tons of supplies. The important fact buried in this statistic is
that all of the merchant ships got through safely. Had a greater effort been expended to resupply Malta at this point, the island could have been in a better position to defend itself and to have become a fully operational base for the British
early in 1941. Instead, Malta became a vortex that drained away vital resources as
the British desperately attempted to sustain the island, its population, and the
marginal operational capabilities that had been established there. Axis forces, in
contrast, operated with great effect in transporting men and supplies throughout the theater.
Measured against the principal task of disrupting Axis convoys to Africa, the
Taranto attack had literally no effect; it increased not at all the British ability to
stop deliveries to Libya. In fact, Italian deliveries to Libya increased during the
months of October 1940–January 1941 to an average of 49,435 tons per month,
up from the 37,204-ton average of the previous four months.83 Losses for the
84
seven-month period of June–December 1940 were less than 2 percent. The
February 1941 to June 1941 statistics are even more telling, with the average
85
monthly Italian deliveries to Libya almost doubling, to 89,563 tons per month.
Effective Italian intelligence enabled the RMI to route convoys to Libya and so
avoid British forces. It was not until 21 December 1940 that aircraft, from Illus86
trious, sank the first two ships of an escorted convoy on the Tripoli route.
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Even with the significant advantage of advanced warning from ULTRA, the
British were unable to disrupt the German buildup in North Africa during the
87
early part of 1941. In February and March 1941, two hundred thousand tons of
Axis shipping was sent from Italian ports to Libya, mainly to Tripoli. During
March 1941 eighty-nine Axis merchant vessels set out in twenty-nine southbound convoys, of which only two were intercepted. Just three ships were lost
and a fourth damaged; although nine thousand tons of stores were lost, 92,700
88
tons arrived safely at Tripoli. This strong logistical position allowed the German commander, General Erwin Rommel, to start on 31 March 1941 an offensive that would sweep the British Eighth Army back through Libya to the
Egyptian frontier by 14 April.
The notable failure of British antishipping forces at this critical juncture in
the war has been overshadowed by the British success at Cape Matapan on 28
and 29 March 1941.89 The extent of the British frustration at this lack of success
was vividly illustrated when on 15 April 1941 Admiral Pound directed
Cunningham to take every possible step to prevent supplies from reaching Libya
from Italy or by coastwise traffic, even if that resulted in serious loss or damage
to His Majesty’s ships: “Failure by the navy to concentrate on prevention of such
movements [enemy supplies to Libya] to the exclusion of everything not abso90
lutely vital will be considered as having let side down.” Ultimately the German
offensive and the Italian requirement to support it were confounded by the
RMI’s inability to fight offensively, either at the tactical or operational level. In
light of that, an antishipping surface force operating out of a fully operational
base at Malta, as envisioned by Cunningham, could have been what was needed
to interdict Italian convoys to Africa. Even marginal increases in the shipping
loss rates in early 1941 could have impacted Rommel’s ability to launch and sustain his desert offensive.
Measured against the operational objective of defeating the Italian navy, the
Taranto attack was only marginally effective. Evidence of this came immediately
after the attack during Operation WHITE, another British attempt to deliver Hurricane fighters to Malta from the carrier Argus. Somerville departed Gibraltar on
15 November 1940 with Renown, Ark Royal, two cruisers, and eight destroyers.
The Italians sortied two battleships, three heavy cruisers, and a force of screening
destroyers. When it became known that the Italian fleet was at large, Somerville
launched the Hurricanes at the extreme limit of their range and then withdrew, resulting in the loss of eight of the twelve aircraft.91 On 28 November major portions
of the RMI, including Vittorio Veneto and Giulio Cesare, six heavy cruisers, and
92
sixteen destroyers, engaged Force H at Cape Teulada. The Italian commander,
Admiral Inigo Campioni, fearing continued attack by FAA aircraft and lacking air
support of his own, decided to avoid a pitched battle and withdrew his forces after
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a brief exchange. This engagement established a pattern that would continue
through the rest of the war—an Italian determination to engage but only when
the tactical situation favored. When important combat factors such as air support,
reconnaissance information, or daylight were questionable, the Italians retired to
fight another day and protect their “fleet in being.” This pattern has often been
used as evidence of an Italian fear of engaging the British. The Italian reality, however, was that they had little to gain from taking chances or pressing unfavorable
tactical situations. The British reality was contested sea control until the Italian capitulation in 1943.
By late August 1941, London had assigned top priority to the Mediterranean.
Only three of Britain’s battleships were stationed with the Home Fleet, while Gibraltar had one and Alexandria four. The remainder was split between Singapore (three ships) and the Indian Ocean (four ships), the latter conveniently
placed for use in either the Middle Sea or the Pacific. Aircraft carrier deployments also favored the Mediterranean, with two each in Alexandria and Gibraltar, one in home waters, and three in the Far East. In short, nine of fifteen British
93
battleships and four of eight carriers were in or near the Mediterranean. In the
course of 1941, actions in the Mediterranean would cost the Royal Navy a total
of one battleship sunk and four badly damaged, one carrier sunk and two damaged, seven cruisers sunk and ten damaged, and sixteen destroyers sunk and
94
twelve damaged—all with little hope of replacement. Far from granting the
strategic freedom claimed by Churchill, the raid on Taranto proved to be a complicated and costly affair for Britain.
After the fall of Greece and Crete there was even less hope of sending ships to
other theaters, and by mid-1942 there were no capital ships left in the Mediterra95
nean Fleet to send. The Mediterranean campaign would eventually cost the
British 244 merchant ships and 135 warships, representing 930,673 and 411,935
96
tons, respectively. The Axis powers had effectively denied the British the central Mediterranean for a protracted period and exacted a terrible cost in men
and ships. The positive results of the British efforts at Taranto could hardly have
justified such catastrophic losses. Decisive action by the British in the two
months after the attack could have turned the tactical success into a monumental victory, but in the event, it was lacking. This raises serious questions about
the conduct of the British campaign in the late 1940–41 time frame. In the context of history, however, the attack at Taranto presents a fascinating insight into
both the limitations and the capabilities of the Royal Navy and its Fleet Air Arm.
A PRICELESS OPPORTUNITY
The British attack on the Italian battle fleet at Taranto Harbor has been celebrated
for the bravery of the pilots who flew the mission and for the great tactical victory
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they achieved. This is just. However, military analysts have further claimed that
Taranto changed the balance of naval power in the Mediterranean and established
the moral ascendance of the Royal Navy over the Italian navy. Unfortunately, the
facts do not support this rhetoric. Despite reducing the effective strength of the
Italian fleet to two battleships, the British had to mount a full-scale operation with
their entire Mediterranean fleet in order to enter the central basin. Italian, and
later German, land-based aircraft allowed the Italians to continue to dispute the
Mediterranean even while the battle fleet was temporarily out of action.
After the attack at Taranto, British naval authorities exhibited a lack of operational insight and so failed in three critical areas: they failed to finish the destruction of the Italian battleships; they failed to eliminate the critical
infrastructure support needed to sustain the battle fleet, in particular the dry
dock and fuel at Genoa; and they failed to exploit their newly won operational
freedom to achieve a theaterwide buildup in logistics by pushing convoys
through to Malta and Alexandria. The Royal Navy had the RMI on the ropes after Taranto but failed to deliver the true knockout blow that would have changed
the context within which the rest of the war in the Mediterranean was fought.
Destruction of the Italian battle fleet in 1940 would have given the British outright sea control in the Mediterranean. Instead, conflict of priorities squandered
a priceless opportunity.
An Italian navy without battleships would have meant a significantly lessened
threat for the British during the remainder of the Mediterranean campaign. Instead, as it was, the continuing presence of the Italian battle fleet had a disproportionate influence on the balance of naval and military power in the
Mediterranean. Admiral Cunningham and his staff struggled to maintain the
97
appropriate fleet mix to counter this potential threat. Simply containing the
Italian capital ships put a huge strain on British resources. Italian battleships
could not be discounted, and on more than one occasion their existence led the
98
British to scuttle damaged ships that might have been saved.
Portrayals of the Italian navy as inept have served to mask the impact of ULTRA
and excuse the British navy’s failure to destroy the Italian fleet, gain control of
99
the Mediterranean, and cut Axis supply lines to Africa before 1943. A decisive
effort against the Italian battleships at Taranto would have destroyed the RMI
strategy of a “fleet in being” and allowed the Royal Navy greater flexibility in
conducting its campaign against a reduced Italian naval threat. The critical decisions made in the planning and execution of the attack at Taranto highlight the
limits of Admiral Cunningham’s appreciation of the new interplay between the
modern elements of sea and air power. Measuring the success gained against the
objectives assigned, the outcome of the British attack at Taranto can be assessed
only as a limited tactical victory with limited operational impact.
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol59/iss3/8

C:\WIP\NWCR\NWC Review Summer 2006.vp
Thursday, July 20, 2006 9:36:35 AM

20

Color profile: Generic CMYK printer profile
Composite Default screen

Caravaggio: The Attack at Taranto

CARAVAGGIO

123

NOTES

The author expresses his appreciation to
Commander Kenneth Hansen of the Canadian Forces College, whose surface warfare
expertise was invaluable in this research.
1. The British Chiefs of Staff concluded that
with the establishment of German aircraft in
Sicily, the Axis had gained temporary control
of the center of the Mediterranean. Defence
Committee (Operations): Minutes (Cabinet
papers, 69/2) 20 January 1941, 9:30 PM. Martin
Gilbert, The Churchill War Papers, vol. 3, The
Ever-Widening War 1941 (London: W. W.
Norton, 2000), p. 101.
2. The main conclusions and assessments of the
Taranto attack are almost uniform throughout the current literature. For example,
“There can be little doubt that the crippling
of half the Italian battlefleet is having, and
will continue to have, a marked effect on the
course of the war. Without indulging in speculation as to political repercussions, it is already evident that this successful attack has
greatly increased our freedom of movement
in the Mediterranean and has thus strengthened our control over the central area of this
sea” (Michael Simpson, ed., The Cunningham
Papers, vol. 1, The Mediterranean Fleet, 1939–
1942. Selections from the Private and Official
Correspondence of Admiral of the Fleet Viscount Cunningham of Hyndhope, O.M., K.T.,
G.C.B., D.S.O. and Two Bars [London: Ashgate,
1999], p. 180). S. W. Roskill wrote, “Thus was
British maritime power reasserted in the central basin,” and “By the air attack at Taranto
and by the two surface ship encounters with
the Italian Fleet, Admirals Cunningham and
Somerville had established a clear moral ascendancy within the Mediterranean” (The
War at Sea 1939–1945, vol. 1, The Defensive
[London: Her Majesty’s Stationery Office,
1956], pp. 301 and 419, respectively).
Even Italian assessments have reflected the
same general conclusions as above. In 1957,
Italian commander Marc Bragadin wrote,
“The Taranto attack had temporary but serious consequences in the strategic field because the Italian Navy was left with only two
battleships in service” (Marc Antonio
Bragadin, The Italian Navy in World War II
[Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1957],
p. 47). In 1966, Italian author Antonio

Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2006

C:\WIP\NWCR\NWC Review Summer 2006.vp
Thursday, July 20, 2006 9:36:35 AM

Trizzino begins a chapter dedicated to
Taranto in his book Navi e poltrone with (in
Cristiano D’Adamo’s translation), “The defeat suffered by the Italian Navy without
fighting the night of November 11–12, 1940,
defined the future of the war between Italy
and Great Britain. Taranto was the Italian
Trafalgar.” In 1976, the Italian historian
Arrigo Petacco wrote, “On November 12th, the
Italian ships which had survived the torpedobombers attack left Taranto to take cover in
the ports of Naples and La Spezia. It was a retreat. After five months of illusionary superiority, the Italian Navy was already in a squeeze”
(Cristiano D’Adamo, “Operation Judgment:
Taranto’s Night,” www.regiamarina.net).
More recently, in Air Power and the Royal
Navy, Geoffrey Till states that Taranto transformed the strategic situation in the Mediterranean (Air Power and the Royal Navy 1914–
1945: A Historical Survey [London: Jane’s,
1979], p. 179). In The Naval War in the Mediterranean, 1940–1943, Jack Greene and
Alessandro Massignani write: “In all, the attack was brilliantly conceived and brilliantly
executed” (The Naval War in the Mediterranean, 1940–1943 [London: Chatham, 2002],
p. 179). In a 2004 work, Michael Simpson
states that “the crippling of half the Italian
battle fleet was of infinite value” and that by
December 1940 “well might Cunningham
conclude that ‘our control of the Mediterranean
was close on being re-established’” (A Life of
Admiral of the Fleet Andrew Cunningham: A
Twentieth-Century Naval Leader [London:
Frank Cass, 2004], pp. 74–75).
3. Michael Simpson states that the Commanders in Chief, Middle East, found themselves having to deal with impractical, often
absurd, schemes proposed by Churchill,
aided and abetted by some of his less sensible
associates, such as Frederick Lindemann,
Churchill’s personal assistant, and Lord
Keyes, the Director of Combined Operations.
Simpson, A Life of Admiral of the Fleet Andrew
Cunningham, p. 76.
4. John B. Hattendorf, R. J. B. Knight, A. W. H.
Pearsall, N. A. M. Rodger, and Geoffrey Till,
eds., British Naval Documents (London:
Scolar, 1993), pp. 779–80.

21

Color profile: Generic CMYK printer profile
Composite Default screen

124

Naval War College Review, Vol. 59 [2006], No. 3, Art. 8

NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW

5. The distance from England to Bombay via the
Cape route added four thousand miles to the
journey; to Singapore it meant another three
thousand miles and to Sydney an extra one
thousand. A. J. Smithers, Taranto 1940: Prelude to Pearl Harbor (Annapolis, Md.: Naval
Institute Press, 1995), p. 61.
6. Correlli Barnett, Engage the Enemy More
Closely: The Royal Navy in the Second World
War (New York: W. W. Norton, 1991), p. 225.
7. G. A. Titterton, The Royal Navy and the Mediterranean, vol. 1, September 1939–October
1940 (London: Whitehall History in association with Frank Cass, 2002), p. 4.
8. Donald Macintyre, The Naval War against
Hitler (London: B. T. Batsford, 1971), p. 120.
9. Under the original naval plan for the RMI,
four new battleships were to have been ready
and four older ones were to have been completely modernized by 1942. In June 1940,
however, only the battleships Cavour and
Cesare were actually in service. Littorio,
Vittorio Veneto, Duilio, and Andrea Doria
were still being fitted out. The Roma needed
two more years of work and Impero at least
three more. The eventual strength of the Italian Navy would consist of six battleships,
seven heavy and twelve light cruisers,
sixty-one fleet destroyers, and 105 submarines. Bragadin, The Italian Navy in World
War II , p. 8.
10. James J. Sadkovich. The Italian Navy in World
War II (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood, 1994),
p. 53.
11. This assumption heavily influenced Italian
ship design and specifications. Sadkovich,
Italian Navy in World War II, p. 5.
12. Admiralty Historical Section, Naval Staff History Second World War: Selected Operations
(Mediterranean) 1940, Battle Summaries No.
2, 8, 9, 10 (London: 1957), p. 1.
13. Milan N. Vego, Naval Strategy and Operations
in Narrow Seas, 2nd ed. (Portland, Ore.: Frank
Cass, 2003), p. 45.
14. Far from a responsible response and proof of
the navy’s interest in avoiding a war, Italian
author Alberto Santoni considers it, on the
basis of Cavagnari’s record of “careful
avoided” noninterference in Mussolini’s political decisions, a “painful way of shrugging
off one’s responsibilities and shows up a

https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol59/iss3/8

C:\WIP\NWCR\NWC Review Summer 2006.vp
Thursday, July 20, 2006 9:36:35 AM

certain class of officer as vain, unreliable, incapable and opportunist.” Alberto Santoni,
“Italian Naval Policy from 1930–1941,” Revue
Internationale d’Histoire Militaire, no. 72
(1990), p. 95.
15. Bragadin, Italian Navy in World War II, p. 5.
16. Bernard Ireland, The War in the Mediterranean: 1940–1943 (Barnsley, U.K.: Leo Cooper,
2004), p. 24.
17. Robert Mallett, The Italian Navy and Fascist
Expansionism 1935–1940 (London: Frank
Cass, 1998), p. 183.
18. Bragadin, Italian Navy in World War II, p. 32.
19. The traditional view in this debate is represented by Brian Sullivan, in his statement that
Mussolini established an independent air
force, granted it a monopoly on aircraft, ordered the transfer of all naval aviation to the
new service, and forbade the navy to construct aircraft carriers (“A Fleet in Being: The
Rise and Fall of Italian Sea Power, 1861–
1943,” International History Review 10, no.1
[February 1988], p. 116). Santoni, on the
other hand, builds a convincing position in
arguing that this was naval propaganda, unjustly blaming Mussolini and the air force,
whereas unedited Italian documents prove
that the Italian naval chief of staff did not
want any aircraft carriers, for technical and
operative reasons (Santoni, “Italian Naval
Policy from 1930–1941,” p. 92).
20. Titterton, The Royal Navy and the Mediterranean, vol. 1, p. xvi.
21. See D’Adamo, “Operation Judgment: Taranto’s
Night.”
22. Bragadin, Italian Navy in World War II, pp.
45–46.
23. Sadkovich, Italian Navy in World War II, p. 45.
24. Eberhard Weichold, “Axis Naval Policy and
Operations in the Mediterranean, 1939 to
May 1943,” in Essays by German Officers and
Officials on World War II (microfilm series),
roll 7, frame 0003 (Wilmington, Del.: Scholarly Resources, n.d.), p. 6.
25. Sadkovich, Italian Navy in World War II, p. 47.
26. The plane had a maximum speed of 125
knots and a ceiling of 10,700 feet. It could
carry one 1,610-pound torpedo or three fivehundred-pound bombs. Thomas P. Lowry
and John W. P. Wellham, The Attack on

22

Color profile: Generic CMYK printer profile
Composite Default screen

Caravaggio: The Attack at Taranto

Taranto: Blueprint for Pearl Harbor (Mechanicsburg, Penna.: Stackpole Books, 1995), p. 22.
27. Admiralty Historical Section, Naval Staff History Second World War, p. 42.
28. Lowry and Wellham, Attack on Taranto, 58.

CARAVAGGIO

48. Warner, Cunningham of Hyndhope, p. 114.
49. David A. Thomas, Malta Convoys 1940–1942:
The Struggle at Sea (Barnsley, U.K.: Leo Cooper,
1999), p. 41.

29. Simpson, ed., The Cunningham Papers, p. 188.

50. Greene and Massignani, Naval War in the
Mediterranean, pp. 107–108.

30. Admiralty Historical Section, Naval Staff History Second World War, p. 42.

51. Simpson, ed., Cunningham Papers, vol. 1,
p. 180.

31. Ibid., p. 43.

52. Thomas, Malta Convoys 1940–1942, pp. 4–42.

32. Titterton, Royal Navy and the Mediterranean,
vol. 2, November 1940–December 1941, p. 7.

53. Titterton, Royal Navy and the Mediterranean,
vol. 1, p. xii.

33. Jack Sweetman, “Taranto: Baptism of Carrier
Warfare,” Naval Institute Proceedings 116, no.
11/1053 (November 1990), p. 103.

54. Sadkovich, Italian Navy in World War II, 5.

34. Smithers, Taranto 1940, p. 106.
35. The Italian squadron at Taranto was preparing to carry out a bombardment of Souda Bay
in the middle of November. Titterton, Royal
Navy and the Mediterranean, vol. 2, p. 10.
36. Admiralty Historical Section, Naval Staff History Second World War, p. 44.
37. “If all alternatives are refused you should as
soon as possible carry out an attack on
Richelieu with torpedo aircraft and maintain
this attack until it is certain she is sufficiently
disabled. Approximately half your torpedoes
should have Duplex pistols and half contact
pistols and endeavour should be made to obtain a hit in the vicinity of propeller.” Admiralty Historical Section, Naval Operations Off
Dakar: July–September 1940, Battle Summaries No. 3 and 20 (London: 1959), p. 13.
38. Ibid., p. 19.
39. Ibid., p. 22.
40. Ibid.
41. Macintyre, Naval War against Hitler, p. 36.
42. Lowry and Wellham, Attack on Taranto, 69.
43. Admiralty Historical Section, Naval Staff History Second World War, pp. 42–43.
44. Macintyre, Naval War against Hitler, p. 38.
45. Titterton, Royal Navy and the Mediterranean,
vol. 2, p. 11.
46. Oliver Warner, Cunningham of Hyndhope:
Admiral of the Fleet (London: Camelot,
1967), p. 114.
47. Bragadin, Italian Navy in World War II, 47.

Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2006

C:\WIP\NWCR\NWC Review Summer 2006.vp
Thursday, July 20, 2006 9:36:35 AM

125

55. Ibid., p. 94.
56. S. W. C. Pack, Cunningham: The Commander
(London: B. T. Batsford, 1974), p. 105.
57. Wayne Hughes, Fleet Tactics (Annapolis,
Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1986), p. 40.
58. Michael Simpson seems to suggest that
Taranto was the main objective and all other
activities were diversionary. “The diversity of
objectives in ‘Judgement’ deceived the enemy
as to the chief offensive purpose” (A Life of
Admiral of the Fleet Andrew Cunningham, p.
73). Roskill seems to support the raid side of
the argument with the phrase, “although
from the nature of this attack it was not to be
expected that the ships would be permanently
disabled” (The War at Sea 1939–1945, vol. 1,
The Defensive, p. 301).
59. Strike warfare is the use of tactical aircraft to
strike against land/naval targets in an offensive power-projection role.
60. Admiralty Historical Section, Naval Staff History Second World War, p. 43.
61. Aircraft E4H of the second wave was targeted
against Gorizia. Aircraft L5Q of the second
wave had a technical problem and had to return to the carrier without firing its torpedo.
Admiralty Historical Section, Naval Staff History Second World War, p. 90.
62. The mooring location of these two ships in
Taranto harbor would have made targeting
with torpedoes difficult but not necessarily
impossible. The size of the bombs used by the
Swordfish for dive-bombing that night may
have only caused marginal damage to the exposed portions of the more heavily armored
battleships, but this targeting choice would have

23

Color profile: Generic CMYK printer profile
Composite Default screen

126

Naval War College Review, Vol. 59 [2006], No. 3, Art. 8

NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW

been more logical since, in the end, one cannot
predict or account for luck or a lucky hit.
63. Update of the facilities at Taranto Harbor to
service the Littorio class of ships was not completed until 1942. Titterton, Royal Navy and
the Mediterranean, vol. 1, p. xv.
64. Admiralty Historical Section, Naval Staff History Second World War, p. 50 note 4.
65. William Jameson, Ark Royal: 1939–1941 (London: Rupert Hart-Davis, 1957), pp. 224–28.
66. Ark Royal had embarked Blackburn Skuas
from 800 Squadron; 810, 818, and 820
Squadrons with TSR 1Swordfish; and 808
Squadron, armed with Fulmar fighters. The
commanding officers of 818 and 820 Squadrons were new, having joined the ship during
the refit. Jameson, Ark Royal: 1939–1941, pp.
224–28.
67. The aircraft complement on Ark Royal was
sixty-seventy aircraft. In November 1940 it
carried twenty-six Fairey Swordfish and
twenty-four Blackburn Skuas. Illustrious
normally carried between thirty-three and
thirty-six aircraft, and Eagle seventeen.
“Royal Navy and World War 2: Aircraft
Carriers,” www.naval-history.net/
WW2BritishShipsAircraftCarriers.htm.

Titterton, Royal Navy and the Mediterranean,
vol. 2, p. 40.
77. Ibid., p 22.
78. Ibid.
79. On 14, 29, and 30 December 1940, British
aircraft mounted raids on Naples, badly damaging one cruiser. On 8 January 1941 another
raid damaged the Vittorio, Veneto, and Cesare.
Ibid., p. xv.
80. Message from Commander in Chief, Mediterranean, to Admiralty, 2015/2218/40.
Titterton, Royal Navy and the Mediterranean,
vol. 1, pp. 99–100.
81. A notional freighter could carry approximately ten thousand tons. Cunningham
would have had to steam some forty freighters into Malta to achieve these numbers by
April 1941. Simpson, ed., Cunningham Papers,
vol. 1, p. 151.
82. Thomas, Malta Convoys 1940–1942, p. 197.
83. Bragadin, Italian Navy in World War II, p. 356.
84. Titterton, Royal Navy and the Mediterranean,
vol. 2, p. xiv.
85. Bragadin, Italian Navy in World War II, p. 356.
86. Titterton, Royal Navy and the Mediterranean,
vol. 2, p. xiv.

68. The Royal Air Force had already cooperated
with the Fleet Air Arm in attacking enemy
merchant ships, supply ports, and naval
bases, by providing long-range reconnaissance and antisubmarine patrols. Titterton,
Royal Navy and the Mediterranean, vol. 2,
p. 6.

87. For a detailed examination of ULTRA and its
impact on the war in the Mediterranean, see
John Winton, Ultra at Sea: How Breaking the
Nazi Code Affected Allied Naval Strategy during World War II (New York: William Morrow,
1988).

69. Ibid., p. 22.

88. Titterton, Royal Navy and the Mediterranean,
vol. 2, p. xvi.

70. Ibid., p. 36.

72. Ibid., p. 44.

89. The Italians lost three heavy cruisers and two
destroyers in this action. Titterton, Royal
Navy and the Mediterranean, vol. 2, p. xvi.

73. Ireland, War in the Mediterranean, p. 52.

90. Winton, Ultra at Sea, p. 165.

74. Bragadin, Italian Navy in World War II, p. 22.

91. Greene and Massignani, Naval War in the
Mediterranean, p. 115.

71. Ibid., p. 37.

75. Winston S. Churchill, Their Finest Hour
(Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1949), p. 450.
76. On 25 December, Force H left the Mediterranean for a five-day operation in the Atlantic
concerned with the appearance of the Admiral Hipper on a raiding expedition. The Admiral Hipper on that day attacked convoy
WS.5A, consisting of twenty-one ships.

https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol59/iss3/8

C:\WIP\NWCR\NWC Review Summer 2006.vp
Thursday, July 20, 2006 9:36:35 AM

92. Also known as the battle of Cape Spartivento.
93. Sadkovich, Italian Navy in World War II, p. 169.
94. Barnett, Engage the Enemy More Closely, p. 377.
95. Charles W. Koburger, Jr., Naval Warfare in
the Eastern Mediterranean, 1940–1945
(Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 1993), p. 134.

24

Color profile: Generic CMYK printer profile
Composite Default screen

Caravaggio: The Attack at Taranto

CARAVAGGIO

96. For merchant tonnage, Thomas, Malta Convoys 1940–1942, p. 196; for warship tonnage,
Bragadin, Italian Navy in World War II, p. 364.

98. Admiralty Historical Section, Selected Convoys (Mediterranean), 1941–1942: Battle Summaries No. 18 and 32 (London: 1957), p. 102.

97. Thomas, Malta Convoys 1940–1942, p. 34.

99. Sadkovich, Italian Navy in World War II, p. 331.

Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2006

C:\WIP\NWCR\NWC Review Summer 2006.vp
Thursday, July 20, 2006 9:36:35 AM

127

25

